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Blackhawk helicopter and put his boots on the ground at the Haitian International Airport, launching Operation Uphold Democracy.
As a Haitian-born American and General Shelton's personal linguist and country adviser, I was in a unique position to observe this unfolding historic event. A massive group of people surrounded us at the airport. We were mobbed by a cast of media people, Navy Seals, Embassy officials, soldiers from the 10 th Mountain Division (Light) (10 th MD [L]), and several senior Haitian military officers. As we made our way through the crowd, the only thing that I could think about was General Shelton's personal safety,
given the uncertainty of Haiti's political, civil, and military environment. After two years of planning, this operation had become a reality. During the next 30 days, a series of negotiations and policy decisions culminated in the removal of an illegal government and the return to power of the duly elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide.
Operation Uphold Democracy was a success story. For once, the Haitian people could see a beacon of hope and a path out of their national misery. However, the celebration soon ended because U.S. policy -and the strategy that implemented that policy -were based on short-term interests rather than long term strategic objectives.
The result was failure.
Over thirteen years later, we have witnessed Haiti's on-going national struggle, which has included another exile for Aristide, several elections, increased drug trafficking, and numerous United Nations resolutions and missions -all to no avail for beleaguered Haitians. Upon his return on 15 October 1994, Aristide had a unique opportunity to change Haiti's future for the better. Instead, he chose not to fulfill commitments he had made to the U.S. for economic and political reforms. Eventually, he failed miserably to redress human rights abuses and used an economic reform agenda to promote his own personal political agenda. 2 The US effort to restore stability and democracy in Haiti indeed reflected an attempt both to learn from past mistakes and to respond to domestic U.S. political pressures. The operation was very popular with the native populace and, by most accounts, scored some notable successes.
However, many observers claim that the U.S. has gained nothing strategically from its recent initiatives in Haiti. While sitting in a Security Managers course in Vilseck, Germany, I was approached by two individuals who deported themselves like CID agents. They told me to pack up.
They had a Blackhawk helicopter waiting to take me back to Heidelberg. They informed me that a three-star general wanted me back at Fort Bragg for an operation. The V Corps G-3 met the helicopter at the airfield and provided instructions for a flight back to the states, which was scheduled to depart eight hours later. Three days later, the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters flew from Fort Bragg to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and embarked on the USS Mount Whitney, the flagship of the U.S. 2 nd Fleet.
As we steamed towards Port-au-Prince, negotiations continued. As the window for heading off an invasion closed, a report from an unknown source warned the Cedras regime that U.S. aircraft were departing Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, for a mission in Haiti. Only then did the Cedras government capitulate. 24 This last-minute The JPOTF's biggest test was the development of a campaign to generate public trust and confidence in the interim Public Security Force (IPSF) which was to replace the notorious Haitian Police force. This effort was made even more difficult when it was learned that many members of the old police force had been incorporated into the new organization. The POTF developed a campaign that emphasized to the population that all members of the police force had been carefully screened regarding prior involvement with the Junta's security forces and had undergone proper training on proper police procedures and respect for human rights.
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A more intricate challenge was to control the "decompression" of Haiti's societal tensions. Planners feared that the sudden elimination of the existing police force would create a security vacuum that neither US military police nor international police monitors would be able to fill. Hence, the authorities faced a dilemma. They could not disband the standing police force, but neither could they permit it to continue to terrorize and intimidate the populace. This dilemma thus necessitated the complex task of supervising and transforming the police force in the streets -which frequently meant defending it from angry citizens prepared to seek a full measure of "mob justice" -while discreetly purging it of its most notorious human rights abusers. In this manner, the multinational force adeptly laid a foundation for an interim police force while organizing a training program to establish an entirely new, professionally trained one. 37 Despite these efforts, the new police force's credibility -in the Haitian public's eyes as well as those of international observers -was a constant source of anxiety. (a) in support of the Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place;
(b) to assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and training, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police;
(c) to assist the Transitional Government, particularly the Haitian National Police, with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and public security measures;
(d) to assist with restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast Guard, as well as with their institution strengthening, including the reestablishment of the corrections system; (e) to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, taking into account the primary responsibility of the Transitional Government in that regard;
(f) to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of police authorities;
II. Political Process:
(a) to support the constitutional and political process under way in Haiti, including through good offices, and foster principles and democratic governance and institutional development;
(b) to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to bring a process of national dialogue and reconciliation;
(c) to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to organize, monitor, and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections at the earliest possible date, in particular through the provision of technical, logistical, and administrative assistance and continued security, with appropriate support to an electoral process with voter participation that is representative of the national demographics, including women;
(d) to assist the Transitional Government in extending State authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels.
III. Human Rights:
(a) to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, particularly of women and children, in order to ensure individual accountability for human rights abuses and redress for victims;
(b) to monitor and report on the human rights situation, in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, including on the situation of returned refugees and displaced persons;
The Security Council also requested that MINUSTAH cooperate and coordinate with the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in carrying out its mandate. 58 
Analysis
Planning based on lessons learned, proper leadership, knowing the enemy, and understanding how to win the hearts and minds of the people of Haiti were essential to the success of Operation Uphold Democracy. General Shelton's experience in the art of negotiation and building relationships was the key ingredient in meeting the goals and objectives of the operation. He kept the enemy in check by ensuring that everyone was treated with respect and dignity while not wavering from the mission. Sun Tzu best described General Shelton's performance in Haiti:
Encourage other leaders. When you see bravery, reward the act. When you see intelligence, reward the attribute. Bring forth potential leaders where one day you will be able to step down so another who is more capable can take your place. The group as a whole will be better for it. But in the meantime, you are truly the undisputed leader with little care for title of the position other than serving your organization. 
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Many in the U.S. government were warned about Aristide's ambitions and untrustworthiness and understood that they were replacing a dictator with an unstable person. Republican Jesse Helms described Aristide as a "psychopath and demonstrable killer," yet the Clinton administration blatantly supported Aristide's return. 63 Democracy technically was never restored after the invasion and Aristide's return to power. Many argue that Haiti is among those nations categorized as a "failed state." Some blame the international community for ignoring Haiti after the 1994 intervention. Others blame the U.S. for racial preferences, favoring light-skinned Cuban boat people to the dark-skinned Haitians. 64 The Haitian economy experienced some surge in the 1995-1997 period, but it continues to suffer mainly due to natural disasters and political setbacks. should help implement the following educational reforms:
Educational opportunities and job opportunities must be broadened for all Haitians while pilot testing Haitian Creole as the official language of Haiti.
In addition, the following should be implemented gradually over time:
1. Increase the current educational budget from 11% to 50% of gross domestic product.
2. Provide educational scholarships to all children who are from poor families.
3. Provide emergency shelter to the current 400,000 child slaves while sending them to school.
Provide technical education to all
Haitians who want to work but lack the means to do so.
5. Create job service referral centers across the island to help graduates get jobs.
6. Facilitate NGO involvement in the educational process by encouraging NGO members to share their educational expertise.
7. Encourage the Haitians Diaspora to participate in the education innovation process. 70 
Leadership and Political Reforms
Haiti has not advanced in many areas due to poor leadership. On 22 September 1994, while translating for General Shelton in Haiti, one local Haitian in the port mentioned to us that "the problem with all Haitians is that they all want to be President and once in office they take the money and run." Haitian leaders for two centuries have lacked the will and ability to respond to the needs of their citizens. The problem with security, and law and order rests with Haiti's judicial system that is directly connected to the constitution. The UN's performance in Haiti has been ineffective so far in establishing a stable environment. The key may be to re-establish a judicial process that will create a credible police force and possibly a new Haitian Army.
Economic Growth
The only way Haiti can build a foundation for economic growth is through sustained investment by the U.S. and international community. Haiti's inexpensive labor market should be globalized to compete with its counterparts in China and Southwest
Asia. According to a 2002 Heritage Foundation report, the island generated about 3 billion in gross domestic product (GDP), which equates to about $370 per capita. The island has one of the world's lowest GDPs and per capita incomes. 73 Haitian leaders need to encourage an open market with a cheap labor pool.
Existing law and the stubbornness of a few are preventing foreign and local investors from developing assets in Haiti. Haitian leaders must provide incentives for reforms such as the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). CBI allows "Haiti duty-free access to the United States for most goods, with some limits placed on apparel." 74 
Conclusion
Without a doubt, the U.S has the ways and means to bring lasting economic and political change to Haiti. The problem, however, lies in the linkage between operational success and the attainment of strategic ends. 75 Although Operation Uphold Democracy's success provided hope for the people of Haiti, the strategic objective was never achieved. General Shelton best described the operation:
The lesson learned of Haiti, and of most other contingency operations in this decade, is that while military forces have excelled in achieving military tasks such as establishing order, separating combatants, or safeguarding relief supplies, they are less effective in solving non-military problems rooted in persistent cultural, economic, and political strife. In cases like Haiti, military forces can help create a secure environment in which to pursue lasting political and economic solutions-but they cannot achieve political outcomes themselves. The burden still remains on the statesman and the international community to pursue integrated approaches that employ a broad range of policy tools and processes to ensure long-term success. 
